The Austrian Army in 1809
Ever since Austerlitz the Austrian
officers had been laboring to reconstitute and reform their army. The
archduke Charles was the foremost amongst many workers who had realized
that numbers were absolutely needed to confront the new French methods.
With these numbers it was impossible to attain the high degree of
individual efficiency required for the old line tactics, hence they were
compelled to adopt the French methods of skirmishers and columns, but as
yet they had hardly realized the increased density necessary to be given
to a line of battle to enable it to endure the prolonged nervous strain
the new system of tactics entailed.
Where formerly
15,000 men to the
mile of front had been considered ample for the occupation of a position
or the execution of an attack, double that number now often proved
insufficient, and their front was broken before reinforcements could
arrive. Much had been done to create an efficient staff, but though the
idea of the army corps command was now no new thing, the senior generals
entrusted with these commands were far from having acquired the
independence and initiative of their French opponents. Hence the
extraordinary slowness of their maneuvers, not because the Austrian
infantry were bad marchers, but because the preparation and circulation.
of orders was still far behind the French standard. The light cavalry
had been much improved and the heavy cavalry on the whole proved a fair
match for their opponents.
The French
Army
After the peace of Tilsit the Grand Army was
gradually withdrawn behind the Rhine, leaving only three commands,
totalling 63,000 men, under Davout in Prussia, Oudinot in west central
Germany, and Lefebvre in Bavaria, to assist the princes of the
Confederation of the Rhine in the maintenance of order and the
enforcement of the French law of conscription, which was rigorously
insisted on in all the States comprised in this new federation.
In exchange for the subsistence of the French troops of occupation, a
corresponding number of these new levies were moved to the south of
France, where they commenced to arrive at the moment when the situation
in Spain became acute. The Peninsular War called for large
forces of the old Grande Armée and for a brief period Napoleon directed
operations in person; and the Austrians took advantage of the
dissemination and weakness of the French forces in Germany’ to push
forward their own preparations with renewed energy.
But they reckoned without the resourcefulness of Napoleon. The moment
news of their activity reached him, whilst still in pursuit of Sir John
Moore, he dispatched letters to all the members of the Confederation
warning them that their contingents might soon be required, and at the
same time issued a series of decrees to General Clarke, his war
minister, authorizing him to call up the contingent of 1810 in advance,
and directing him in detail to proceed with the formation of 4th and 5th
battalions for all the regiments across the Rhine. By these means Davout’s, Oudinot’s and Lefebvre’s commands were augmented,
whilst in February and March new corps were formed and rapidly pushed
towards the front.
On his return from Spain, seeing war imminent, he issued a series of
march orders (which deserve the closest study in detail) by which on the
15th of April his whole army was to be concentrated for maneuvers between Regensburg, Landshut, Augsburg and Donauworth, and sending on
the Guard in wagons to Strassburg, he despatched Berthier to act as
commander-in-chief until his own arrival.
Austrian
Offensive
The position of assembly was excellently
chosen, but unfortunately the Austrians took the initiative. On the 9th
of April their main body of six corps crossed the Inn between Braunau
and Passau, and simultaneously two additional corps moved from Pilsen in
Bohemian-Regensburg. At this moment Davout was entering Regensburg with his
leading troops, the remainder still some marches in rear, and it was
evident that the whole concentration could no longer be carried out
before the Austrians would be in a position to intervene. Berthier
received the news while still on his way to the front, and quite failed
to grasp the situation. Reaching Donauwörth at 8 P.M. on the 13th of
April, he ordered Payout and Oudinot to remain at Regensburg, whilst
Lefebvre and Wrede (Bavarians) who had fallen back before the Austrians
were directed to reoccupy Landshut. T
his was in direct contradiction
with the instructions Napoleon had given him on the 28th of March in
view of this very emergency. Davout obeyed, but remonstrated. On the
16th Berthier went on to Augsburg, where he learnt that Lefebvre’s
advanced troops had been driven out of Landshut, thus opening a great
gap seventy-six miles wide between the two wings of the French army.
Meanwhile Napoleon, who had left Paris at 4 A.M. on the 13th of April,
was hastening towards the front, but remained still in ignorance of
Berthier’s doings until on the 16th at Stuttgart he received a letter
from the Marshal dated the 13th, which threw him into consternation. In
reply he immediately wrote:
"You
do not inform me what has rendered necessary such an
extraordinary measure which weakens and divides my troops" and
" I
cannot quite grasp the meaning of your letter yet, I should have
preferred to see my army concentrated between Ingolstadt and Augsburg,
the Bavarians in the first line, with the duke of Danzig in his old
position, until we know what the enemy is going to do. Everything would
be excellent if the duke of Auerstädt had been at Ingolstadt and the
duke of Rivoli with the Wurtternbergers and Oudinot’s corps at Augsburg,
so that just the opposite of what should have been done has been
done."
(C. N. to Berthier, Ludwigsburg, 16th April).
Napoleon takes
command
Having dispatched
this severe reprimand he hastened on to Donauwdrth, where he arrived at
4 AM. on the 17th, hoping to find Berthier, but the latter was at
Augsburg. Nevertheless, at 10 AM. he ordered Payout and Oudinot to withdraw at once to Ingolstadt; and Lefebvre and
Wrede on the right to SunDort the movement. About noon Berthier returned and after hearing his explanation Massena received
orders to move from Augsburg towards Ingolstadt. "Tomorrow will be a
day of preparation spent in drawing closer together, and I expect to be
able by Wednesday to maneuver against the enemy’s columns according to
circumstances."
Meanwhile the Austrians had approached so near that by a single day’s
march it would have been possible to fall upon and crush by superior
numbers either wing of the French army, but though the Austrian light
cavalry successfully covered the operations of the following troops they
had not yet risen to a conception of their reconnoitering mission, and
the archduke, in ignorance of his opportunity and possessed, moreover,
with the preconceived idea of uniting at Regensburg with the two corps
coming from Bohemia, moved the bulk of his forces in that direction,
leaving only a covering body against Davout altogether insufficient to
retain him. Davout, however, had left a garrison of 1800 men in
Regensburg, who delayed the junction of the Austrian wings until the
20th, and on the same day the emperor, having now reunited his
whole right wing and center, overwhelmed the covering detachments facing
him in a long series of disconnected engagements lasting forty-eight
hours, and the archduke now found himself in danger of being forced back
into the Danube. But with the Bohemian reinforcements he had stifi four
corps in hand, and Napoleon, whose intelligence service in the difficult
and intersected country had lamentably failed him, had weakened his army
by detaching a portion of his force in pursuit of the beaten right wing,
and against the archduke’s communications,
When, therefore, the latter, on the 22nd, marched
southward to reopen his communications by the defeat of the enemy’s
army, always the surest means of solving this difficulty, he actually
reached the neighborhood of Eckmiihl with a sufficient numerical
superiority had he only been prompt enough to seize his opportunity. But
the French bad been beforehand with him. Napoleon, who had personally
taken part in the fighting of the previous day, and followed the pursuit
as far as Landshut, whence he had dispatched Massena to follow the
retreating Austrians along the Isar, seems to have realized about 3 AM
in the morning that it was not the main body of the enemy he had had
before him, but only its left wing, and that the main. body itself must
still be northward towards Regensburg.
Issuing orders to Payout, Oudinot
and his cavalry to concentrate with all speed towards Eckmuhl, he
himself rode back along the Regensburg road and reached the battle-field
just as the engagement between the advance troops had commenced. Had the
Austrians possessed mobility equal to that of the French the latter
should have been overwhelmed in detail, but whilst the French covered 17
and 19 m. the Austrians only marched 10, and, owing to the defect in
their tactical training alluded to above, the troops actually on the
ground could not hold out long enough for their reserves to arrive. The
retreat of the front lines involved the following ones in. confusion,
and presently the whole mass was driven back in. considerable disorder.
It seemed as if nothing could save the Austrians from complete disaster,
but at the critical moment the emperor, yielding to the protestations of
his corps commanders, who represented the excessive fatigue of their
troops, stopped the pursuit, and the archduke made the most of his
opportunity to restore order amongst his demoralized men, and crossed to
the north bank of the Danube during the night.
Austrian
Retreat
On the following morning the French reached
Regensburg and at once proceeded to assault its medieval walls, but the
Austrian garrison bravely defended it till the last of the stragglers
was safely across on the north bank. It was here that for the only time
in his career Napoleon was slightly wounded. Then, leaving Payout to
observe the archduke’s retreat, the emperor himself rode after Massena,
who with the major portion of the French army was following the Austrian
weaker wing under Hiller. The latter was not so shaken as Napoleon
believed, and turning to hay inflicted a severe check on its pursuers
who at Ebelsbe had lost many men in three fruitless assaults. Thus covered by his rearguard Hiller
gained
space and time to pass his troops over to the north bank of the Danube
and remove all boats on the river. This left the direct road to Vienna
open, and Napoleon, hoping to find peace in the enemy’s capital, pushed
the whole of his army down the right bank, and with Murat’s cavalry
entered the city on the 12th of May, after somewhat severe resistance
lasting three days. Meanwhile the archduke and Hiller, both now
unmolested, effected their junction in the vicinity of Wagram, picketing
the whole line of the Danube with their outposts and collecting all the
boats.
Aspern and Wagram
The reconnaissance of the river was at once
taken in hand by the French upon their arrival in Vienna, and a point
opposite the island of Lobau selected for the crossing. Thanks to the
Austrian precautions it took four days to collect the necessary material
to span the main branch of the river, here some 2000 yds. across, and
though Napoleon personally spurred on all to activity nearly four days
more were required for its construction. It was not till the night of
the 19th of May that orders for the passage were finally issued, and
during the night the troops commenced to occupy the island of Lobau.
Surprise, of course, was out of the question, but the Austrians did not
attempt to dispute the passage, their object being to allow as many
French as they felt they could deal with to pass over and then to fall
on them.
Thus on the 21st of May the battle of Aspern or Essling
began. It ended on the night of the 22nd with the complete defeat of
Napoleon, the first ever inflicted upon him. The French retreated into
the island of Lobau. By nightfall upwards of 100,000 men, encumbered
with at least 20,000 wounded, were crowded together on the little island
scarcely a mile square, short of provisions and entirely destitute of
course of all hospital accessories. The question then arose whether the
retreat was to be continued across the main stream or not, and for the
second time in his career Napoleon assembled his generals to take their
opinion. They counseled retreat, but having heard them all he replied,
in substance: "If we leave here at all we may as well retire to
Strassburg, for unless the enemy is held by the threat of further
operations he will be free to strike at our communications and has a
shorter distance to go. We must remain here and renew operations as soon
as possible."
Immediate orders were
dispatched to summon every available body of
troops to concentrate for the decisive stroke. Practically the lines of
communication along the Danube were denuded of combatants, even
Bernadotte being called up from Passau, and the viceroy of Italy, who
driving the archduke Johann before him (action of Raab) had brought up
56,000 men through Tirol, was disposed towards Pressburg within easy
call. The arsenal of Vienna was ransacked for guns, stores and
appliances, and preparations in the island pushed on as fast as
possible. By the end of June 200,000 troops were stationed within call,
and on the 4th of July the French began to cross over to the left bank of
the Danube. The events which followed are described under WAGRAM. The
great battle at this place, fought on the 5th and 6th of July, ended in
the retirement of the Austrians. The only other event which occurred
before peace was made was an unimportant action at Znaym on the 15th of
July.