Around the Prussian army, and particularly the
cavalry, the prestige of Frederick the Great’s glory still lingered; but
the younger generation had little experience of actual warfare, and the
higher com-manders were quite unable to grasp the changes in
tactics and in the conduct of operations which had grown out of the
necessities of the French Revolution. The individual officers of the
executive staff were the most highly trained in Europe, but there was no
great leader to co-ordinate their energies. 
The total number of men
assigned to the field army was 110,000 Prussians and Saxons. They were
organized in corps, but their leaders were corps commanders only in
name, for none were allowed any latitude for individual initiative.
Poorly judged economies had undermined the whole efficiency of the Prussian
army. Two-thirds of the infantry and one-half of the cavalry were
allowed furlough for from ten to eleven months in the year. The men were
not provided with greatcoats. Most of the muskets had actually seen
service in the Seven Years’ War, and their barrels had worn so thin with
constant polishing that the use of full charges at target practice had
been forbidden. Above all, the army had drifted entirely out of touch
with the civil population. The latter, ground down by feudal tradition
and law, and at the same time permeated by the political doctrines of
the late 18th century, believed that war concerned the governments only,
and formed no part of the business of the “honest citizen.” In this idea
they were supported by the law itself, which protected the civilian
against the soldier, and forbade even in war-time the requisitioning of
horses, provisions and transport, without payment. Up to the night of
the battle of Jena itself, the Prussian troops lay starving in the midst
of plenty, whilst the French everywhere took what they wanted. This
alone was a sufficient cause for all the misfortunes which followed.
Outbreak of the War
During the campaign of Austerlitz Prussia,
furious at the violation of her territory of Anspach, had mobilized, and
had sent Haugwitz as ambassador to Napoleon’s headquarters. He arrived
on the 30th of November, and Napoleon, pleading business, put off his
official reception till after the battle of Austerlitz. Of course the
ultimatum was never presented, as may be imagined; Haugwitz returned and
the king of Prussia demobilized at once. But Napoleon, well knowing the
man he had to deal with, had determined to force a quarrel upon Prussia
at the earliest convenient opportunity. His troops therefore, when
withdrawn from Austria, were cantoned in south Germany in such a way
that, whilst suspicion was not aroused in minds unacquainted with
Napoleonic methods, they could be concentrated by a few marches behind
the Thuringian forest and the upper waters of the Main. ‘Here the Grand
Army was left to itself to recuperate and assimilate its recruits, and
it is characteristic of the man and his methods that he did not trouble
his corps commanders with a single order during the whole of the spring
and summer.
As the diplomatic crisis approached, spies were sent into Prussia,
and simultaneously with the orders for preliminary concentration the
marshals received private instructions, the pith of which cannot be
better expressed than in the following two quotations from Napoleon’s
correspondence:
Mon intention est de concentrer toutes mes forces sur
l’extrémité de ma droite en laissant tout l’espace entre Ic Rhin et Bamberg
entibrement dégarni, de manière a avoir près de 200,000 hommes réunis
sur un même champ de bataille; mes premieres marches menacent Ic cmur de
Ia monarchic prussienne.
Avec cette immense supériorité de forces réunis sur un espace si
étroit, vous sentez que je suis dans la volonté de ne rico hasarder et
d’attaquer l’ennemi partout ofi il voudra tenir. Vous pensez bien que cc
serait une belle affaire que de se porter stir cetce place (Dresden) en
un bataillon carré de 200,000 hommes
Advance of the Grande
Armée
On the 7th of October the Grande Armêe lay in three parallel columns along the roads leading over the
mountains to Hof, Schleiz and Kronach at
Hemmendorf, with the Augereau extending south to the Main
at Burgebrach.
Napoleon’s object being surprise, all the cavalry except a few
vedettes were kept back behind the leading infantry columns and these
latter were ordered to advance, on the signal being given,so as to crush at once any outpost resistance which was
calculated upon the time required for the deployment of ordinary
marching columns. This order has never since found an imitator, but
deserves attentive study as a masterpiece.
To meet the impending blow the Prussians had been extended in a
cordon along the great road leading from Mainz to Dresden, Biücher was
at Erfurt, Ruchel at Gotha, Hohenlohe at Weimar, Saxons in Dresden, with
outposts along the frontier. An offensive move into Franconia was under
discussion, and for this purpose the Prussian staff had commenced a
lateral concentration about Weimar, Jena and Naumburg when the storm
burst upon them. The emperor gathered little from the confused reports
of their purposeless maneuvers, but, secure in the midst of his
“battalion square” of 200,000 men, he remained quite indifferent, well
knowing that an advance straight on Berlin must force his enemy to
concentrate and fight, and as they would bring at most 127,000 men on to
the battlefield the result could hardly be doubtful. On the 9th of
October the cloud burst. Out of the forests which clothe the northern
slopes the French streamed forth, easily
overpowering the resistance of the Prussian outposts and once the open country was reached the cavalry under Murat
trotted to the front, closely followed by Bernadotte’s corps as “general
advance guard.” The result of the cavalry scouting was however
unsatisfactory.
In the meanwhile, however, the Saxons had been
moving from Naumburg through Gera on Jena, Hohenlohe was near Weimar, and all the other
divisions of the army had closed in a march,
the idea of an offensive to the southward which Napoleon had himself attributed to
them having already disappeared.
Murat reported the Altenburgo movement of the Saxons on the previous day,
but omitted to send a strong detachment in
pursuit. The traces of the Saxons were lost, and
Napoleon, little satisfied with his cavalry, authorized Lasalle to offer up
a reward for information of the Prussian point of concentration.
At 1AM of the 12th Napoleon issued his orders. In the meantime
the Prussians were effecting their concentration.
Ruchel, who with 15,000 men had been sent into
the mountains as an advanced guard for the projected
offensive, was recalled to Weimar, which he reached on the 13th. The whole
army, upwards of 120,000 men, could therefore have
been concentrated against Lannes and Augereau, whilst Soult could only have intervened very
late in the day, and Davout and Bernadotte were still too distant to
reach the battlefield before the 14th. All the French corps, moreover,
were so exhausted by their rapid marches over bad roads that the emperor
actually ordered at 1AM. on the 13th a day of rest for all except
Davout, Bernadotte, Lannes and Murat.
The Prussian headquarters, however, spent the 12th and
13th in idle discussion, whilst the troop commanders exerted themselves to obtain
some alleviation for the suffering of their starving men. The defeats
undergone by their outpost detachment had profoundly affected the nerves
of the troops, and on the afternoon. of the 11th, on the false alarm of
a French approach, a panic broke out in the streets of Jena, and it took
all the energy of Hohenlohe and his staff to restore order. On the
morning of the 12th the Saxon commanding officers approached Hohenlohe
with a statement of the famishing condition of their men, and threatened
to withdraw them again to Saxony. Hohenlohe pointed out that the
Prussians were equally badly off, but promised to do his best to help
his allies. Urgent messages were sent off to the Commissary von Goethe
(the poet), at Weimar for permission to requisition food and firewood.
These requests, however, remained unanswered, and the Prussians and
Saxons spent the night before the battle shivering in their miserable
bivouacs.
The 13th of October
During the early morning of the 13th the
reports brought to Napoleon at Gera partially cleared up the situation,
though the real truth was very different from what he supposed. However,
it was evident that the bulk of the Prussians lay to his left, and
instructions were at once dispatched to Davout to turn westward from
Naumburg towards Kösen and to bring Bernadotte with him if the two were
still together. The letter, however, ended with the words “but I hope he
is already on his way to Dornburg.”
Now Bernadotte neglected to keep the emperor informed as to his whereabouts. He
was still with Davout, but, concluding that he had missed an order
directing him to Dornburg, he thought to conceal his error by assuming
the receipt of the order evidently alluded to in the last words, and as
a result he marched towards Dornburg, and his whole corps was lost to
the emperor at the crisis of the next day’s battle.
On the road from Gera to Jena Napoleon was met by intelligence from
Lannes announcing his occupation of Jena and the discovery of Prussian
troops to the northward. Knowing the emperor’s methods, he wisely
restrained the ardour of his subordinates and asked for instructions
whether to attack or wait. The emperor rode forward rapidly, reached
Jena about 3 P.M., and with Lannes proceeded to the Landgrafenberg to reconnoiter. From this point his view was, however, restricted to the
immediate foreground, and he only saw the camps of Hohenlohe’s left
wing. At this moment the Prussians were actually on parade and ready to
move off to attack, but just then the “evil genius “of the Prussian
army, von Massenbach, an officer of the Headquarter Staff, rode up and
claiming to speak with the authority of the king and commander-in-chief,
induced Hohenlohe to order his troops back to camp. Of all this Napoleon
saw nothing, but from all reports he came to the conclusion that the
whole Prussian army was actually in front of him, and at once issued
orders for his whole army to concentrate towards Jena, marching all
night if need be.
Six hours earlier his conclusion would have been
correct, but early that morning the Prussian headquarters, alarmed for
the safety of their line of retreat on Berlin by the presence of the
French in Naumburg, decided to leave Hohenlohe and Ruchel to act as rear
guard, and with the main body to commence their retreat towards the
river Unstrutt and the Eckhardtsberge where Massenbach had previously reconnoitered
an “ideal” battlefield. This belief in. positions was the
cardinal principle of Prussian strategy in these days. The troops had
accordingly commenced their march on the morning of the 13th, and now at
3PM were settling down into bivouac; they were still but a short
march from the decisive field.
Jena
On the French side, Lannes’ men were working
their hardest, under Napoleon’s personal supervision, to make a
practicable road up to the Landgrafenberg, and all night long the
remaining corps struggled through darkness towards the rendezvous.
Hohenlohe had determined to drive the French into the ravine at
daybreak, but had no idea as to the numbers in front of him. For want of
room, only a few Prussian battalions were sent forward, and these, delaying their advance till
the fog had sufficiently lifted, were met by French skirmishers, and
small columns, who rapidly overlapped their flanks and drove them back
in confusion. Hohenlohe now brought up the remainder of his command, but
in the meanwhile the French had poured across the neck between the
Landgrafenberg and the main plateau, and the troops of Soult and
Augereau were working up the ravines on either hand.
In view of these
troops the Prussian line, which had advanced faultlessly as if on
parade, halted to prepare its bayonet attack by fire, and, once halted,
it was found impossible to get them to go on again. The French who had
thrown themselves into houses and copses, picked off the officers,
and the flanks of the long Prussian lines swayed and got into confusion.
The rival artilleries held each other too thoroughly to be able to spare
attention to the infantry, whilst the Prussian cavalry, which had
forgotten how to charge in masses of eighty or more squadrons, frittered
away their strength in isolated efforts. By 10AM. the fourteen
battalions which had initiated this attack were outnumbered by three to
one, and drifted away from the battlefield. Their places were taken by a
fresh body, but this was soon outnumbered and outflanked in its turn. By
2PM the psychic moment had come, and Napoleon launched his guards and
the cavalry to complete the victory and initiate the pursuit. Ruchel’s
division now arrived and made a most gallant effort to cover the
retreat, but their order being broken by the torrent of fugitives, they
were soon overwhelmed by the tide of the French victory and all
organized resistance had ceased by 4PM.
Briefly summarized, the battle came to this:
in four successive
efforts the Prussians failed because they were locally outnumbered. This
was the fault of their leaders solely, for, except for the last attack,
local superiority was in each case attainable. Organization and tactics
did not affect the issue directly, for the conduct of the men and their
junior officers gave abundant proof that in the hands of a competent
leader the “linear“ principle of delivering one shattering blow would
have proved superior to that of a gradual attrition of the enemy here,
as on the battlefields of the Peninsula and at Waterloo, and this in
spite of other defects in the training of the Prussian infantry which
simultaneously caused its defeat on the neighboring field of Auerstädt.
Battle of
Auerstädt
Here the superiority of French mobility, a
consequence of their training and not necessarily of their system,
showed its value most conclusively. Davout in obedience to his orders of
the previous morning was marching over the Saale at Kosen, when his advanced guard came in contact with
that of the Prussian main army. ‘The latter with at least 50,000 men was
marching in two columns, and ought therefore to have delivered its men
into line of battle twice as fast as the French, who had to deploy from
a single issue, and whose columns had opened out in the passage of the
Kösen defile and the long ascent of the plateau above.
But the Prussians attacked at the old regulation speed of seventy-five paces to the
minute, and the French maneuvered at the quick or double of 120 or 150.
The consequence was that the French always succeeded in reinforcing
their fighting line in time to avert disaster. Nevertheless by mid-day
their strength was well-nigh exhausted, whilst the Prussian reserve,
eighteen battalions of guards under Kalckreuth, stood intact and ready
to engage. But at the critical moment the duke of Brunswick fell
mortally wounded, and Scharnhorst, his chief of the staff, was at the
time absent on another part of the field. Meanwhile rumors from the
battlefield at Jena, magnified as usual, began to reach the staff, and
these may possibly have influenced Kalckreuth, for when appealed to to
attack with his eighteen battalions and win the day, he declined to move
without the direct order of the commander-in-chief to do so, alleging
that it was the duty of a reserve to cover the retreat and he considered
himself personally responsible to the king for the guards entrusted to
his care. Even then the day might have been saved had Blucher been able
to find even twenty squadrons accustomed to gallop together, but the
Prussian cavalry had been dispersed amongst the infantry commands, and
at the critical moment it proved impossible for them to deliver a united
and decisive attack.
Seeing further efforts hopeless, Scharnhorst in the duke’s name
initiated the retreat and the troops withdrew N.W. towards Buttelstedt,
almost unmolested by the French, who this day had put forth all that was
in them, and withstood victoriously the highest average punishment any
troops of the new age of warfare had as yet endured. So desperate had
been their resistance that the Prussians unanimously stated Davout’s
strength at double the actual figure. Probably no man but Davout could
have got so much out of his men, but why was he left unsupported?
Bernadotte, we have seen, had marched to Dornburg, or rather to a
point overlooking the ford across the Saale at the village of that name,
and reached there in ample time to intervene on either field. But with
the struggle raging before him he remained undecided, until at Jena the
decision had clearly fallen, and then he crossed the river and arrived
with fresh troops too late for their services to be required.
Prussian Retreat
During the night the Prussians continued their
retreat, the bulk of the main body to Sömmerda, Hohenlohe’s corps
towards Nordhausen. The troops had got much mixed up, but as the French
did not immediately press the pursuit home, order was soon reestablished and a combined retreat was begun towards the mouth of the
Elbe and Lübeck. Here help was expected to arrive from England, and the
tide might yet have turned, for the Russian armies were gathering in the
east. It was now that the results of a divorce of the army from the
nation began to be felt. Instead of seizing all provisions and burning
what they could not remove, the Prussian generals enforced on their men
the utmost forbearance towards the inhabitants, and the fact that they
were obeyed, in spite of the inhumanity the people showed to their sick
and wounded countrymen, proves that discipline was by no means so far
gone as has generally been believed.
The French marching in pursuit were
received with open arms, the people even turning their own wounded out
of doors to make room for their French guests. Their servility awakened
the bitterest contempt of their conquerors and forms the best excuse for
the unparalleled severity of the French yoke. On the 26th of October
Davout reached Berlin, having marched 166 m. in twelve days including
two sharp rearguard actions, Bernadotte with his fresh troops having
fallen behind. The inhabitants of Berlin, headed by their mayor, came
out to meet him, and the newspapers lavished adulation on the victors
and abuse on the beaten army. On the 28th Murat’s cavalry overtook the
remnant of Prince Hohenlohe’s army near Prenzlau (N. of Berlin) and
invited its capitulation. Unfortunately the prince sent Massenbach to
discuss the situation, and the latter completely lost his head. Murat
boasted that he had 100,000 men behind him, and on his return Massenbach
implored his chief to submit to an unconditional surrender, advice which the prince accepted, though as a fact Murat’s horses
were completely exhausted and he had no infantry whatever within call.
Only Blucher now remained in the field, and he too was driven at length
into Lflbeck with his back to the sea.
Campaigns in Poland and East Prussia
Hitherto the French had
been operating in a rich country, untouched for half a century past by
the ravages of war, but as the necessity for a campaign against the
Russians confronted the emperor, he realized that his whole supply and
transport service must be put on a different footing. After t
he wants of
the cavalry and artillery had been provided for, there remained but
little material for transport work. Exhaustive orders to organize the
necessary trains were duly issued, but the emperor seems to have had no
conception of the difficulties the tracks—there were no metalled
roads—of Poland were about to present to him. Moreover, it was one thing
to issue orders, but quite another to ensure that they were obeyed, for
they entailed a complete transformation in the mental attitude of the
French soldier towards all that he had been taught to consider his
duties in the field. Experience only can teach the art of packing wagons
and the care of draught animals, and throughout the campaign the small
ponies of Poland and East Prussia broke down by thousands from over
loading and unskillful packing.
The Russian Army formed the most complete contrast to the
French that it is possible to imagine. Though clad, armed and organized
in European fashion, the soldiers retained in a marked degree the
traditions of their Mongolian forerunners, their transport wagons were
in type the survival of ages of experience, and their care for their
animals equally the result of hereditary habit. The intelligence of the
men and regimental officers was very low, but on the other hand service
was practically for life, and the regiment the only home the great
majority bad ever known. Hence obedience was instinctive and initiative
almost undreamt of. Moreover, they were essentially a war trained army,
for even in peace time their long marches to and fro within the empire
had most thoroughly inured them to hardship and privation. Napoleon
might have remembered his own saying: “La misêre est l’école du bon
soldat.” In cavalry they were weak, for the Russian does not take kindly
to equitation and the horses were not equal to the accepted European
standard of weight, while the Cossack was only formidable to stragglers
and wounded. Their artillery was numerous and for the most part of heavy
caliber, but the strength of the army lay
in its infantry, with its incomparable tenacity in defense and its blind
confidence in the bayonet in attack.
Advance to the
Vistula
Napoleon had from the first been aware of
the secret alliance between Prussia and Russia, sworn by their
respective sovereigns over the grave of Frederick the Great, and this
knowledge had been his principal reason for precipitating hostilities
with the former. He remained, however, in complete ignorance of the
degree of preparation attained on the Russian side, and since the
seizure of Warsaw together with the control of the resources of Poland
in men and material its’ occupation would afford, was the chief factor
in his calculation, he turned at once to the eastward as soon as all
further organized resistance in Prussia was ended by the surrender of
Prenzlau and Ltibeck. Scarcely leaving his troops time to restore their
worn-out footgear, or for the cavalry to replace their jaded horses from
captured Prussian resources, he set Davout in motion towards Warsaw on
the 2nd of November, and the remainder of the army followed in
successive echelons as rapidly as they could be dispatched.
The cavalry, moving well in advance, dispersed the Prussian depôts
and captured their horses, as far as the line of the Vistula, where at
last they encountered organized resistance from the outposts of
Lestocq’s little corps of 15,000 men, all that was left of Frederick
the
Great’s army. These, however, gave way before the threat of the
advancing French and after a few trifling skirmishes. Davout entered
Warsaw on the 30th of November, being followed by Guard corps during the
succeeding fortnight. Jerome’s corps was composed of the Bavarians,
Wurttembergers and Badensers.
Behind these all Prussia was overrun by newly formed units, (3rd and
4th battalions) raised from depot companies, conscripts for 1807, and
old soldiers rejoining after sickness or wounds. Napoleon caused these
to be dispatched to the front immediately after their formation. He had
much territory to occupy, and in the long march of on an average 85
days, he considered that they could be organized, equipped and drilled
en route.
Pultusk
The Russians meanwhile had been moving slowly forward in
two bodies, one under Bennigsen (50,000), the other under Buxhowden
(25,000), and the French being at this time in Warsaw, they took up
threatening positions about Pultusk, Plock and Prassnitz. From this
triangle they harried the French communications with Berlin, and to
secure a winter’s rest for his men Napoleon determined to bring them to
action. On the 23rd of December operations were commenced, but the
difficulties of securing information and maintaining communication
between the respective columns, so unlike what any of the French had
previously encountered, led to a very partial success. The idea had been
to induce the Russians to concentrate about Pultusk and, turning their
position from its left, ultimately to cut them off from Russia, and if
possible to surround them. But in this new and difficult country the
emperor found it impossible to time his marches.
The troops arrived late
at their appointed positions, and after a stubborn rearguard action at
Pultusk itself and indecisive fighting elsewhere, the
Russians succeeded in retreating beyond the jaws of the French attack,
and Napoleon for the first time found that he had exceeded the limit of
endurance of his men. Indeed, the rank and file bluntly told him as much
as he rode with the marching columns. Yielding to the inevitable, but
not forgetting to announce a brilliant victory in a bulletin, he sent
his troops into winter quarters along the Passarge and down the Baltic,
enjoining on his corps commanders most strictly to do nothing to disturb
their adversary
Campaign of Eylau
Bennigsen, now commanding the whole Russian
army which with Lestocq’s Prussians amounted to 100,000, also moved into winter quarters in the triangle
Deutsch-Eylau-Osterode-Allenstein, and had every intention of remaining there, for a fresh army was already gathering in Russia,
the 1st corps of which had reached Nur.
Unfortunately, Ney with his corps about Gilgenberg had received
the most poverty-stricken district in the whole region, and to secure
some alleviation for the sufferings of his men he incautiously extended
his cantonments till they came in contact with the Russian outposts.
Apparently seeing in this movement a recommencement of hostilities,
Bennigsen concentrated his troops towards his right and commenced an
advance westwards towards Danzig, which was still in Prussian hands.
Before his advance both Ney and Bernadotte (the latter, between Ney and
the Baltic, covering the siege of Danzig) were compelled to fall back.
It then became necessary to disturb the repose of the whole army to
counter the enemy’s intentions.
The latter by this movement, however,
uncovered his own communication with Russia, and the emperor was quick
to seize his opportunity. He received the information on the 28th of
January. His orders were at once issued and complied with with such
celerity that by the 31st he stood prepared to advance. Thorn covered his outer
flanks. Bernadotte, however, was missing, and this time through no fault of
his own. His orders and the dispatch conveying Napoleon’s instructions
fell into the hands of the Cossacks, and just in time Bennigsen’s eyes
were opened. Rapidly renouncing his previous intentions, he issued
orders to concentrate on Allenstein; but this point was chosen too far
in advance and he was anticipated by Murat and Soult at that place on
the 2nd of February. He then determined to unite his forces at
Joukendorf, but again he was too late.
Soult and Murat attacked his
rearguard on the 3rd, and learning from his Cossacks that the French
corps were being directed so as to swing round and enclose him, he
withdrew by a night march and ultimately succeeded in getting his whole
army, with the exception of von Lestocq’s Prussians, together in the
strong position along the Alle, the center of which is marked by
Preussisch-Eylau. The opportunity for this concentration he owed to the
time gained for him by his rearguard at Joukendorf, for this had stood
just long enough to induce the French columns to swing in to surround
him, and the next day was thus lost to the emperor as his corps had to
extend again to their maneuvering intervals. The truth is that the days
were too short and the roads too bad for Napoleon to carry out the full
purpose his “general advanced guard” was intended to fulfill. It was
designed to hold the enemy in position by the vigor of its attack, thus
neutralizing his independent will power and compelling him to expend his
reserves in the effort to rescue the troops engaged. But in forests and
snowdrifts the French made such slow progress that no sufficient
deployment could be made until darkness put a stop to the fighting.
Thus, when late on the 7th of February 1807 Murat and Soult overtook the
enemy near Eylau, the fighting was severe but not prolonged. This
time, however, Bennigsen, with over 60,000 men in position and more Prussians expected to arrive next morning, had no desire to avoid a
battle, and deployed for action, his front protected by great batteries
of guns, many of them of heavy caliber.
During the night Augereau and the Guards had arrived, and Ney and
Davout were expected on either flank in the forenoon. This time the
emperor was determined his enemy should not escape him, and about 8AM,
ordered Soult and Augereau on the left and right respectively to assail
the enemy, Murat and the Guards remaining in the center as reserve.
Napoleon’s own forces thus became the “general advanced guard” for Ney
and Davout, who were to close in on either side and deliver the decisive
stroke. But here too the weather and the state of the roads operated
adversely, for Ney came up too late, while Davout, in the full tide of
his victorious advance, was checked by the arrival of Lestocq, whose
corps Ney had failed to intercept, and the attack of Augereau’s corps made in a blinding
snowstorm, failed with the appalling loss of over 40% killed and
wounded.
Augereau himself was severely wounded, and the remnant of his
corps was subsequently distributed amongst the other corps. Bennigsen,
however, drew off on Ney’s arrival, and the French were too much
exhausted to pursue him. Again the emperor had to admit that his troops
could do no more, and bowing to necessity, he distributed them into
winter quarters, where, however, the enterprise of the Cossacks, who
were no strangers to snow and to forests, left the outposts but little
repose.
A protracted period of rest followed, during which the emperor
exerted himself unremittingly to re-equip, reinforce and supply his
troops. Hitherto he had been based on the entrenched camp of Warsaw, but
he had already taken steps to organize a new line of supply and retreat
via Thorn, and this was now completed. At the same time Lefebvre was
ordered to press the siege of Danzig with all vigour, and on the 5th of
May, after a most gallant resistance, Kalckreuth, who redeemed here his
failure of Auerstädt, surrendered. English assistance came too late. By
the beginning of June the French had more than made good their losses
and 210,000 men were available for field service.
Heilsberg and Friedland
Meanwhile Bennigsen had prepared for a
fresh undertaking, and leaving Lestocq with 20,000 Prussians and
Russians to contain Bernadotte, who lay between Braunsberg and Spandau
on the Passarge, he moved southwards on the 2nd, and on the 3rd and 4th
of June he fell upon Ney, driving him back towards Guttstadt, whilst
with the bulk of his force he moved towards Heilsberg, where he threw up
an entrenched position. It was not till the 5th that Napoleon received
tidings of his advance, and for the moment these were so vague that he
contented himself by warning the remainder of his forces to be prepared
to move on the 6th. Next day, however, all doubts were set at rest, and
as the Russians advanced south of Heilsberg, he decided to wheel his
whole force to the right, pivoting on the corps, and cut Bennigsen
off from Konigsberg and the sea. On the 8th the Guard corps, together with a new cavalry reserve corps under Lannes, in
all 147,000, stood ready for the operation, and with Murat and Soult as
general advanced guard the whole moved forward, driving the Russian
outposts before them. Bernadotte, who was to have attacked Lestocq,
again failed to receive his orders and took no part in the following
operations.
Murat attacked the Russians, who had halted in their entrenched
position, on the 11th and drove in their outposts, but did not discover
the entrenchments. Meanwhile Soult had followed with his infantry in
dose support, and the emperor himself arriving, ordered him to attack at
once. Now the Russians uncovered their entrenchments, and in the absence
of artillery preparation Soult’s leading troops received most severe
punishment. Fresh troops arriving were sent in to his support, but these
also proved insufficient, and darkness alone put an end to the struggle,
which cost the French 12,000 killed and wounded.
Bennigsen, however, learning that his right was threatened by the
III. corps, and not having as yet completed his concentration, retreated
in the night to Bartenstein, and the following day turned sharp to right
towards Schippenbeil. The emperor now pressed on towards Friedland,
where he would completely control the Russian communications with
Konigsberg, their immediate base of supply, but for once the Russians
outmarched him and covered their movement so successfully that for the
next three days he seems to have completely lost all knowledge of his
enemy’s whereabouts. Lestocq in the meantime had been forced northwards
towards Konigsberg, and Soult with Murat was in hot pursuit. The Guard corps followed the main road towards
Konigsberg, and the former had reached Milhlhausen, the remainder were
about Preussisch-Eylau, when Latour Maubourg’s dragoons sent in
intelligence which pointed to the presence of Bennigsen about
Friediland. This was indeed the case. The Russians after passing
Schippenbeil had suddenly turned northwards, and on the evening of the
13th were taking up a strong position on the river Alle with
Friedland as a center.
What followed presents perhaps the finest instance of the Napoleonic
method. The enemy lay direct to his right, and Murat and his corps had well overshot the mark. Lannes’s reserve corps (cavalry), to
whom Latour Maubourg reported, lay at Domnau to the right.
The latter at once assumed the role of advanced guard cavalry and was
ordered to, observe the enemy at Friedland, Ney following in close
support. Davout was turned about and directed on the enemy’s right, and
the corps (Mortier), the Guards and the reserve cavalry followed
as main body. On the 14th (the anniversary of Marengo) Lannes carried
out his role of fighting advanced guard or screen, the emperor’s main
body gradually came up, and the battle of Friedland notable
chiefly for the first display of the new artillery tactics of the
French, ended with a general attack about 5PM and the retreat of the
Russians, after severe losses, over the Alle. Lestocq was, meanwhile,
driven through Konigsberg (which surrendered on the 15th) and
now that he was no longer supported by the Russians, the Prussian
commander gave up the struggle.