The Convention of Tauroggen became the
starting-point of Prussia’s regeneration. As the news of the destruction
of the Grande Armée spread, and the appearance of countless stragglers
convinced the Prussian people of the reality of the disaster, the spirit
generated by years of French domination burst out. For the moment the
king and his ministers were placed in a position of the greatest
anxiety, for they knew the resources of France and the boundless
versatility of their arch enemy far too well to imagine that the end of
their sufferings was yet in sight. To disavow the acts and desires of the
army and of the secret societies for defense with which all north
Germany was honeycombed would be to imperil the very existence of the
monarchy, whilst an attack on the wreck of the Grand Army meant the
certainty of a terrible retribution from the new armies now rapidly
forming on the Rhine.
But the Russians and the soldiers were resolved to continue the
campaign, and working in collusion they put pressure on the not
unwilling representatives of the civil power to facilitate the supply
and equipment of such troops as were still in the field; they could not
refuse food and shelter to their starving countrymen or their loyal
allies, and thus by degrees the French garrisons scattered about the
country either found themselves surrounded or were compelled to retire
to avoid that fate. Thus it happened that the viceroy of Italy felt
himself compelled to depart from the positive injunctions of the emperor
to hold on at all costs to his advanced position at Posen, where about
14,000 men bad gradually rallied around him, and to withdraw step by
step to Magdeburg, where he met reinforcements and commanded the whole
course of the lower Elbe.
Napoleon’s Preparations
Meanwhile the emperor in Paris had been
organizing a fresh army for the reconquest of Prussia. Thanks to his
having compelled his allies to fight his battles for him, he had not as
yet drawn very heavily on the fighting resources of France.
He had also created in 1811 - 1812 a new National Guard, organized in
“cohorts” to distinguish it from the regular army, and for borne defense
only, and these by a skilful appeal to their patriotism and judicious
pressure applied through the prefects, became a useful reservoir of
half-trained men for new battalions of the active army. Levies were also
made with rigorous severity in the states of the Rhine Confederation,
and even Italy was called on for fresh sacrifices. In this manner by the
end of March upwards of 200,000 men were moving towards the Elbe, and
in the first fortnight of April they were duly concentrated in the angle
formed by the Elbe and Saale, threatening on the one hand Berlin, on the
other Dresden and the east.
Spring Campaign of
1813
The allies, aware of the gradual
strengthening of their enemy’s forces but themselves as yet unable to
put more than 200,000 in the field, had left a small corps of
observation opposite Magdeburg and along the Elbe to give timely notice
of an advance towards Berlin; and with the bulk of their forces had
taken up a position about Dresden, whence they had determined to march
down the course of the Elbe and roll up the French from right to left.
Both armies were very indifferently supplied with information, as both
were without any reliable regular cavalry capable of piercing the screen
of outposts with which each endeavored to conceal his disposition, and
Napoleon, operating in a most unfriendly country, suffered more in this
respect than his adversaries.
On the 25th of April Napoleon reached Erfurt and assumed the chief
command. On this day his troops stood in the following positions.
Eugene, with Lauriston’s, Macdonald’s and Regnier’s corps, on the lower
Saale, Ney in front of Weimar, holding the defile of Kdsen; the Guard at
Erfurt, Marmont at Gotha, Bertrand at Saalfeld, and Oudinot at Coburg,
and during the next few days the whole were set in motion towards
Merseburg and Leipzig, in the now stereotyped Napoleonic order, a strong
advanced guard of all arms leading, the remainder, about two thirds of the
whole this time, owing to the cover
afforded by the Elbe on the left, to the right rear of the advanced
guard.
Meanwhile the Russians and Prussians had concentrated all available
men and were moving on an almost parallel line, but somewhat to the
south of the direction taken by the French. On the 1st of May Napoleon
and the advanced guard entered Lützen. Wittgenstein, who now commanded
the allies in place of Kutusov, hearing of his approach, bad decided to
attack Napoleon always gave them out as 300,000, but this number was never
attained, the French advanced guard, which he took to be their whole force, on
its right flank, and during the morning had drawn together the bulk of
his forces on his right in the vicinity of GrossGorschen and Kaya.
Battle of Lützen
About 9 a.m. on May 2nd he began an attack on
the French advance guard in Lutzen, whilst the remainder of his army was
directed against Napoleon’s right and rear. Just as the latter were
moving off the heads of the French main body suddenly appeared, and at
11AM. Napoleon, then standing near the Gustavus Adolphus monument on
the field of Lützen, heard the roar of a heavy cannonade to his right
rear. He realized the situation in a moment, galloped to the new scene
of action, and at once grouped his forces for decisive action the gift
in which he was supreme. Leaving the leading’ troops to repulse as best
they might the furious attack of both Russians and Prussians, and caring
little whether they lost ground, he rapidly organized for his own
control a battle-reserve. At length when both sides were exhausted by
their efforts he sent forward nearly a hundred guns which tore asunder
by their case-shot fire the enemy’s line and marched his reserve right
through the gap. Had he possessed an adequate cavalry force the victory
would have been decisive. As it was, the allies made good their retreat
and the French were too exhausted for infantry pursuit.
Perhaps no battle better exemplifies the inherent strength of the
emperor’s strategy, and in none was his grasp of the battlefield more
brilliantly displayed, for, as he fully recognized, “These Prussians
have at last learnt something—they are no longer the wooden toys of
Frederick the Great,” and, on the other hand, the relative inferiority
of his own men as compared with his veterans of Austerlitz called for
far more individual effort than on any previous day. He was everywhere,
encouraging and compelling his men, it is a legend in the French army
that the persuasion of the imperial boot was used upon some of his
reluctant conscripts, and in the result his system was fully justified,
as it triumphed even against a great tactical surprise.
Bautzen
As soon as possible the army pressed on in pursuit, Ney
being sent across the Elbe to turn the position of the allies at
Dresden. This threat forced the latter to evacuate the town and retire
over the Elbe, after blowing up the stone bridge across the river.
Napoleon entered the town hard on their heels, but the broken bridge
caused a delay of four days, there being no pontoon trains with the
army. Ultimately on the 18th of May the march was renewed, but the
allies had continued their retreat in leisurely fashion, picking up
reinforcements by the way. Arrived at the line of the Spree, they took
up and fortified a very formidable position about Bautzen. Here,
on the 20th, they were attacked, and after a two days’ battle dislodged
by Napoleon; but the weakness of the French cavalry conditioned both the
form of the attack, which was less effective than usual, and the results
of the victory, which were extremely meager.
The allies broke off the action at their own time and retired in such
good order that the emperor failed to capture a single trophy as proof
of his victory. The enemy’s escape annoyed him greatly, the absence of
captured guns and prisoners reminded him too much of his Russian
experiences, and he redoubled his demands on his corps commanders for
greater vigor in the pursuit. This led the latter to push on without
due regard to tactical precautions, and Blllcher took advantage of their
carelessness when at Haynau (May 26), with some twenty squadrons of
Landwehr cavalry, he surprised, rode over and almost destroyed Maison’s
division. The material loss inflicted on the French was not very great,
but its effect in raising the moral of the raw Prussian cavalry and
increasing their confidence in their old commander was, enormous.
Still the allies continued their retreat and the French were unable
to bring them to action. In view of the doubtful attitude of Austria,
Napoleon became alarmed at the gradual lengthening of his lines of
communication and opened negotiations. The enemy, having everything to
gain and nothing to lose thereby, agreed finally to a six weeks’
suspension of arms. This was perhaps the gravest military error of
Napoleon’s whole career, and his excuse for it, “want of adequate cavalry,” is the strongest
testimony as to the value of that arm.
The
Autumn Campaign
As soon as a suspension of arms (to 15th of
August) had been agreed to, Napoleon hastened to withdraw his troops
from the dangerous position they occupied with reference to the passes leading
over the mountains from Bohemia, for he entertained no doubt now
that Austria was also to be considered as an enemy. Finally he decided
to group his corps round Görlitz and Bautzen whence they could either
meet the enemy advancing from Breslau or fall on his flank over the
mountains if they attempted to force their way into Saxony by the valley
of the Elbe. This latter maneuver depended, however, on his maintenance
of Dresden, and to this end he sent the Corps up the Elbe to Pirna
and Konigstein to cover the fortifications of Dresden itself. His
instructions on this point deserve the closest study, for he foresaw the
inevitable attraction which a complete entrenched camp would exercise
even upon himself, and, therefore, limited his engineers to the
construction of a strong bridge head on the right bank and a continuous
enceinte, broken only by gaps for counter attack, around the town
itself.
Then he turned his attention to the plan for the coming campaign.
Seeing clearly that his want of an efficient cavalry precluded all ideas
of a resolute offensive in his old style, he determined to limit himself
to a defense of the line of the Elbe, making only dashes of a few days’
duration at any target the enemy might
present.
Reinforcements had been coming up without ceasing and at the
beginning of August he calculated that he would have 300,000 men
available about Bautzen and along the Elbe from Hamburg via
Magdeburg to Torgau. With the latter he determined to strike the first
blow, by a concentric advance on Berlin (which he calculated he would
reach on the 4th or 5th day), the movement being continued thence to
extricate the French garrisons in Küstrin, Stettin and Danzig. The moral effect, he promised himself, would be prodigious,
and there was neither room nor food for these 100,000 elsewhere.
Towards the close of the armistice he learned the general situation
of the allies. The crown prince of Sweden (Bernadotte), with his Swedes
and various Prussian levies, 135,000 in all, lay in and around Berlin
and Stettin; and knowing his former marshal well, Napoleon considered
Oudinot a match for him. Bliicher with about 95,000 Russians and
Prussians was about Breslau, and Schwarzenberg, with nearly 180,000
Austrians and Russians, lay in Bohemia. In his position at Bautzen he
felt himself equal to all his enemy’s combinations.
Dresden
The advance towards Berlin began punctually with the
expiration of the armistice, but with the main army he himself waited to
see more clearly his adversaries’ plans. At length becoming impatient
he advanced a portion of his army towards Blucher, who fell back to draw
him into a trap. Then the news reached him that Schwarzenberg was
pressing down the valley of the Elbe, and, leaving Macdonald to observe
Blucher, he hurried back to Bautzen to dispose his troops to cross the
Bohemian mountains, a blow which
must have had decisive results. But the news from Dresden was so
alarming that at the last moment he changed his mind, and sending
Vandamme alone over the mountains, he hurried with his whole army to the
threatened point. This march remains one of the most extraordinary in
history, for the bulk of his forces moved, mainly in mass and across
country, 90 m. in 72 hours, entering Dresden on the morning of the 27th,
only a few hours before the attack of the allies commenced.
Dresden was the last great victory of the First Empire. By noon on
the 27th August the Austrians and Russians were completely beaten and in
full retreat, the French pressing hard behind them, but meanwhile
Napoleon himself again succumbed to one of his unaccountable attacks of apparent intellectual
paralysis. He seemed unaware of the vital importance of the moment,
crouched shivering over a bivouac fire, and finally rode back to
Dresden, leaving no specific orders for the further pursuit.
French Defeats
The allies, however, continued to retreat, but
unfortunately Vandamme, with his single corps and unsupported, issued
out of the mountains on their flank, threw himself across their line of
retreat near KuIm, and was completely overwhelmed by sheer weight of
numbers (29th). In spite of this misfortune, Napoleon could claim a
brilliant success for himself, but almost at the same moment news
reached him that Ouclinot at Grossbeeren near Berlin, and Macdonald on
the Katzbach opposed to Bliicher, had both been severely defeated.
Napoleon’s Movemenls
During the next two days the emperor
examined his situation and dictated a series of notes which have been a
puzzle to every strategical thinker ever since. In these he seems
suddenly to have cut adrift from every principle the truth of which he
had himself so brilliantly demonstrated, and we find him discussing
plans based on hypothesis, not knowledge, and on the importance of
geographical points without reference to the enemy’s field army. From
these reveries he was at length awakened by news which indicated that
the consequences of Macdonald’s defeat had been far more serious to the
moral of that command than he had imagined. He immediately rode over to
establish order, and his manner and violence were so improper that
Caulaincourt had the greatest difficulty in concealing the scandal.
Blucher, however, hearing of his arrival, at once retreated and the
emperor followed, thus uncovering the passes over the Bohemian
mountains, a fact of which Schwarzenberg was quick to take advantage.
Learning of his approach, Napoleon again withdrew to Bautzen. Then
hearing that the Austrians had counter-marched and were again moving
towards Dresden, he hastened back there, concentrated as many men as
could conveniently be handled, and advanced beyond Pirna and Konigstein
to meet him. But the Austrians had no intention of attacking him, for
time was now working on their side and, leaving his men to starve in the
exhausted district, the emperor again returned to Dresden, where for the
rest of the month he remained in an extraordinary state of vacillation.
On the 4th of October he again drew up a review of the situation, in
which he apparently contemplated giving up his communications with
France and wintering in and around Dresden, though at the same time he
is aware of the distress amongst his men for want of food.
Campaign of Leipzig
In the meanwhile Blticher, Schwarzenberg and
Bernadotte were working round his flanks. Ney, who had joined Oudinot
after Grossbeeren, had been defeated at Dennewitz (6th Sept.), the
victory, won by Prussian troops solely, giving the greatest
encouragement to the enemy. Suddenly Napoleon’s plans are again reviewed
and completely changed. Calling up St. Cyr, whom he had already warned to
remain at Dresden with his command, he decides to fall back towards
Erfurt, and go into winter quarters between that place and Magdeburg,
pointing out that Dresden was of no use to him as a base and that if he
does have a battle, he had much better have St. Cyr and his men with him
than at Dresden. He then on the 7th of October drew up a final plan, in
which one again recognizes the old commander, and this he immediately
proceeded to put into execution, for he was now quite aware of the
danger threatening his line of retreat from both Blucher and
Scliwarzenberg and the North Army; yet only a few hours afterwards the
portion of the order relating to St. Cyr and Lobau was cancelled and the
two were finally left behind at Dresden. From the 10th to the 13th
Napoleon lay at Düben, again a prey to the most extraordinary
irresolution, but on that day he thought he saw his opportunity. Blucher
was reported near Wittenberg, and Schwarzenberg was moving slowly round
to the south of Leipzig. The North Army under Bernadotte, unknown to
Napoleon, lay on Blucher’s left. The emperor decided to
throw the bulk of his force on Blucher, and, having routed him, turn
south on Schwarzenberg and sever his communications with Bohemia. His
concentration was effected with his usual sureness and celerity, but whilst the French moved on
Wittenberg, Blucher was marching to his right, indifferent to his
communications as all Prussia lay behind him.
This move on the 14th brought him into touch with Bernadotte, and now
a single march forward of all three armies would have absolutely
isolated Napoleon from France; but Bernadotte’s nerve failed him, for on
hearing of Napoleon’s threat against Wittenberg he decided to retreat
northward, and not all the persuasions of Blücher and Gneisenau could
move him. Thus if the French movement momentarily ended in a blow in the
air, it was indirectly the cause of their ultimate salvation.
The Battle of the Nations
On the 15th Napoleon concentrated
his forces to the east of Leipzig, with only a weak detachment to the
west, and in the evening the allies were prepared to attack him.
Schwarzenberg, with 180,000 men available at once and 60,000 on the
following day; Bernadotte now could not
arrive before the 18th.
Napoleon prepared to throw the bulk of his force upon Schwarzenberg
and massed his troops south east of the town, whilst Schwarzenberg
marched concentrically against him down the valley of the Elster and
Pleisse, the mass of his troops on the right bank of the latter and a
strong column under Giulay on the left working round to join Blucher on
the north. The fighting which followed was most obstinate, but the
Austrians failed to make any impression on the French positions, and
indeed Giulay felt himself compelled to withdraw to his former position.
On the other hand, Blucher came
within a mile of the gates of the town. During the 17th there was only
indecisive skirmishing, Schwarzenberg waiting for his reinforcements
coming up by the Dresden road, Blucher for Bernadotte to come in on his
left, and by some extraordinary oversight Giulay was brought closer in
to the Austrian center, thus opening for the French their line of
retreat towards Erfurt, and no information of this movement appears to
have been conveyed to Blucher. The emperor when he became aware of the
movement, sent corps to Lindenau to keep the road open.
On the 18th the fighting was resumed and by about noon Bernadotte
came up and closed the gap to the NE of the town between Blücher and
the Austrians. At 2PM the Saxons, who had remained faithful to
Napoleon longer than his other German allies, went over to the enemy.
All hope of saving the battle had now to be given up, but the French
covered their retreat obstinately and by daybreak next morning one half
of the army was already filing out along the road to Erfurt which had so
fortunately been left for them.
Retreat of the French and Battle of Hanau
It took Blücher time
to extricate his troops from the confusion into which the battle had
thrown them, and the garrison of Leipzig and the troops left on the
right bank of the Elster still resisted obstinately hence no direct pursuit could be initiated and the French, still
upwards of 100,000 strong, marching rapidly, soon gained distance enough
to be reformed. Blucher followed by parallel and inferior roads on
their northern flank, but Schwarzenberg knowing that the Bavarians also
had forsaken the emperor and were marching under Wrede, 50,000 strong,
to intercept his retreat, followed in a most leisurely fashion. Blucher
did not succeed in overtaking the French, but the latter, near Hanau,
found their way barred by Wrede with 50,000 men and over in guns in a
strong position.
To this fresh emergency Napoleon and his army responded in most
brilliant fashion. As at Krasnoi in 1812, they went straight for their
enemy and after one of the most brilliant series of artillery movements
in history, directed by General Drouot, they marched right over their
enemy, practically destroying his whole force. Henceforward their march
was unmolested, and they reached Mainz on the 5th of November.