Described are the campaigns as directed by Napoleon in central and eastern Europe, when he was no longer merely one amongst many French generals, nor even a simple primus inter pares, but Emperor in the fullest sense.  

These campaigns took place between the years 1805 and 1814.

 


The Austrian War of 1805


The Conquest of Prussia and the Polish Campaign


The Austrian War of 1809


The Russian War of 1812


The German War of Liberation - The Battle of the Nations


Campaign in France 1814

No military career has been examined more often and more freely than that of Napoleon. Fortunately the industry and ability of the military history section of the French General Staff have rendered available, by the publication of the original orders issued during the course of his campaigns, a mass of information which, taken in conjunction with his own voluminous correspondence, renders it possible to trace the growth of his military genius with a reasonable approach to accuracy.  Formerly we could only watch the evolution of his powers of organization and the purely psychic gifts of resolution and command. The actual working of his mind towards that strategic and tactical ascendancy that rendered his presence on the battlefield, according to the testimony of his opponents, equal to a reinforcement of 40,000 men, was entirely indiscernible.

The history of his youth reveals no special predilection for the military service, the bent of his mind was political far more than military, but unlike the politicians of his epoch he consistently applied scientific and mathematical methods to his theories, and desired above all things a knowledge of facts in their true relation to one another. His early military education was the best and most practical then attainable, primarily because he had the good fortune to come under the influence of men of exceptional ability Baron du Keile, Bois Roger and others. From them he derived a sound knowledge of artillery and fortification, and particularly of mountain warfare, which latter was destined to prove of inestimable service to him in his first campaigns of I794 - 95 and 1796. In these, as well as in his most dramatic success of Marengo in 1800, we can discern no trace of strategical innovation. He was simply a master of the methods of his time. Ceaseless industry, energy and conspicuous personal gallantry were the principal factors of his brilliant victories, and even in 1805 at Ulm and Austerlitz it was still the excellence of the tactical instrument, the army, which the Revolution had bequeathed to him that essentially produced the results.

Meanwhile the mathematical mind, with its craving for accurate data on which to found its plans (the most difficult of all to obtain under the conditions of warfare), had been searching for expedients which might serve him to better purpose, and in 1805 he had recourse to the cavalry screen in the hope of such results, This proved a palliation of his difficulty, but not a solution. Cavalry can only observe, it cannot hold. The facts as to the position of an opponent accurately observed and correctly reported at a given moment, afford no reliable guarantee of his position 48 hours later, when the orders based on this information enter upon execution. This can only be calculated on the ground of reasonable probability as to what it may be to the best interest of the adversary to attempt. But what may seem to a Napoleon the best course is not necessarily the one that suggests itself to a mediocre mind, and the greater the gulf which separate the two minds the greater the uncertainty which must prevail on the side of the abler commander.

A partial explanation of this phenomenon may perhaps be found in the economy of nervous energy his strategical method ensured to him. Marching always ready to fight wherever his enemy might stand or move to meet him, his mind was relieved from all the hesitations which necessarily arise in men ‘less confident in the security of their designs. Hence, when on the battlefield the changing course of events left his antagonists mentally exhausted, he was able to face them with will power neither bound nor broken. But this only explains a portion of the mystery that surrounds him, and which will make the study of his career the most fascinating to the military student of all times.

Amongst all the great captains of history, he stands alone. Both, in his powers of organization and the mastery of the tactical potentialities of the weapons of their day, was immeasurably ahead of his times, and both also understood to the full the strategic art of binding and restraining the independent will power of their opponents.

 

 

 





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